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Job Wars at Fort Wayne 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] Several international unions and the national AFL-CIO have developed sophisticated proposals 
calling for an "industrial policy" which would utilize a business-government-labor structure for planning 
national economic activities. Yet to be developed, however, are any guidelines for labor's participation in 
local economic development activities. 
Since 1982 Fort Wayne, Indiana, has pioneered what is being touted as one of the most aggressive and 
successful economic development programs in the country. An economic development consulting firm, 
the Fantus Company, was used to organize the business community around an agenda designed to 
weaken labor and encourage a series of job wars with other communities. A careful examination of the 
Fort Wayne Strategy reveals a program that is subtly yet deeply anti-union, anti-worker, and not in the long-
run interests of the people of Fort Wayne. A review of the Fort Wayne Strategy and local labor's response 
can provide valuable lessons for the labor movement across the country. 
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Business-Led Development 
Job Wars at 
Fort Wayne 
* Mark Crouch 
Across the country, one community after another has been 
crippled by plant closings. Local government leaders are faced 
with the task of attempting to rebuild local economies to make 
up for the lost jobs and revenues. Attracting new business, 
retaining existing industry, and creating a proper "business 
climate" have become major activities of thousands of Chambers 
of Commerce and other economic development organizations in 
the United States. Politicians proudly proclaim a new "spirit of 
cooperation" between the private and public sectors, as devastated 
communities scramble to repair the wreckage. 
Frequently local labor leaders are asked to participate in these 
economic development planning activities, joining with business 
and government representatives on tripartite committees, an 
official "mayor's task force," a private "growth association" or a 
"community futures board." Labor's role in these committees, 
however, is often limited to providing the appearance of community-
wide support for special deals cooked up in the back room 
between business leaders and their allies in local government. 
In many communities experiencing shutdowns, an anti-labor 
• Mark Crouch is Coordinator and Associate Professor of Labor Studies, Indiana 
University on the Campus of Indiana University-Purdue University at Fort Wayne. 
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climate has been created through skillful employer manipulation 
of the media. If labor leaders refuse to participate in economic 
development activities, they risk being labeled "non-cooperative." 
If they agree to participate in order to monitor the activities for 
anti-labor efforts, they risk being used as token workers' represen-
tatives to lend credibility to a process dominated by business. 
Business and government often attempt to relegate labor to roles 
which include participation in labor-management cooperation 
committees, negotiation of concessions-laden contracts, or 
declaration of a moratorium on organizing new employers in the 
community. If labor leaders reject these roles, they are often 
labeled "obstructionists." Anti-labor groups can then charge, "First 
labor destroyed our community, then they torpedoed our efforts 
to rebuild it." 
Several international unions and the national AFL-CIO have 
developed sophisticated proposals calling for an "industrial policy" 
which would utilize a business-government-labor structure for 
planning national economic activities. Yet to be developed, 
however, are any guidelines for labor's participation in local 
economic development activities. 
Since 1982 Fort Wayne, Indiana, has pioneered what is being 
touted as one of the most aggressive and successful economic 
development programs in the country. An economic development 
consulting firm, the Fantus Company, was used to organize the 
business community around an agenda designed to weaken labor 
and encourage a series of job wars with other communities. A 
careful examination of the Fort Wayne Strategy reveals a program 
that is subtly yet deeply anti-union, anti-worker, and not in the 
long-run interests of the people of Fort Wayne. A review of the 
Fort Wayne Strategy and local labor's response can provide 
valuable lessons for the labor movement across the country. 
Fort Wayne—Factory Town, Union Town 
Fort Wayne is a community of approximately 300,000 in north-
eastern Indiana, near the Ohio and Michigan borders. Its location 
at the confluence of three rivers made it an early site for 
commerce, transportation and manufacturing. Prior to World War 
I, Fort Wayne was regarded as one of the strongest union towns 
in the country due to community support of several militant strikes 
against the railroads. Following World War I the Fort Wayne labor 
movement suffered serious setbacks as strikes were broken 
between 1919 and 1923 at Bowser Pump, Wayne Knitting Mills, 
and the Pennsylvania Railroad. 
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After passage of the Wagner Act in 1935, the first NLRB election 
in the country was held at the Wayne Knitting Mills. During the 
30s and 40s the United Electrical Workers (UE) organized 
production workers at General Electric and numerous other 
industrial employers in the area. The UE became a potent force 
in the community, with membership approaching 30,000 prior to 
the red-baiting and internal political struggles of the 1950s. By the 
1970s the United Auto Workers had become the dominant union 
in the Fort Wayne area, based on Locals 57 and 305 at the 
International Harvester Heavy-Duty Truck Plant, where employ-
ment peaked at 10,600 in 1978. 
As the 1970s ended, the national economy was mired in a 
recession that struck hardest at the durable goods industries. Fort 
Wayne had traditionally been dependent on durable goods 
manufacturing, providing 31% of all employment in 1970, compared 
to a U.S. average of 16%. By 1981 durable goods employment had 
shrunk dramatically to 24% of area employment while the U.S. 
average slipped to 13%. Much of this decline in manufacturing 
employment was a result of major employers—including 
Magnavox, Tokheim, Franklin Electric and General Electric— 
relocating work to Sunbelt states. Between 1969 and 1982 GE 
eliminated over 5,000 of its 6,700 bargaining unit jobs, shifting 
production of its motors and transformers to the Sunbelt and 
Juarez, Mexico. 
This deindustrialization of the community and the continuing 
effects of the recession that had begun in 1979 eliminated 30,000 
area jobs by 1982, shrinking payroll employment by 13%. The 
unemployment rate remained in double digits from June 1980 
through February 1984. 
Responding to the mounting problems of job loss, business 
leaders began pursuing a new economic development effort. In 
early 1982, a Chicago-based consulting firm, the Fantus Company, 
was hired to provide an economic development study and "battle 
plan" to help the city attract new employers. Since the Fantus 
study, a substantial number of manufacturing plants has located 
in the area, and by spring 1986 the unemployment rate had fallen 
to 5 percent. The Fort Wayne Strategy, however, did not allow 
community participation in the planning process, weakened 
organized labor, and resulted in jobs of questionable quality. 
Fantus Sets the Agenda 
A critical analysis of the Fantus battle plan and its use reveals 
a powerful means to mobilize community support around a pro-
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One of the first trucks to roll off the International Harvester 
assembly line in Fort Wayne in 1923. . . . 
business agenda with subtle anti-worker elements. The battle plan 
included a review of the area's economic base, an assessment of 
the business climate, suggestions for improving the climate, and 
a list of more than 1,000 companies in 32 target industries that 
were likely prospects for location in the area. 
The ideology underlying this approach assumes that communities 
must compete to attract and retain migrating capital. A proper 
business climate must be maintained which serves the interests 
of those controlling investment decisions at the expense of others 
in the community. Armed with the recommendations of what 
appeared to be outside, objective experts, Fort Wayne area business 
leaders were able to magnify their influence in all facets of 
community affairs. 
The Fantus assessment of Fort Wayne's business climate focused 
on three areas: the cost of doing business, local operating 
conditions, and quality of life for company personnel. The 36 
factors considered—ranging from transportation networks to 
utility costs to availability of land and buildings—were evaluated 
through comparisons with other communities also competing for 
jobs. Factors ranked "Above Average" were obvious assets to be 
maintained and exploited in promotional campaigns. Factors rated 
"Average" would meet the needs of most companies but could use 
improvement. Factors ranked "Below Average" needed improvement 
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. the last truck off the Fort Wayne assembly line. 
because they would eliminate Fort Wayne from consideration by 
most firms. Where objective data provided by government 
agencies was unavailable, Fantus used admittedly subjective 
impressions based on interviews with sixty unnamed business and 
community leaders. 
The underlying anti-worker and anti-labor orientation became 
apparent with Fantus ratings of labor supply, labor attitudes, wage 
levels, and labor managment relations. An unemployment rate 
over 11% and an underpaid (and mostly non-union) clerical labor 
force, for example, made Labor Supply and Clerical Wage Levels 
assets. 
Manufacturing Wage Levels, however, were viewed as a liability 
due to average hourly earnings of $10.19 in January 1982 for the 
22 employers surveyed. Since the names of the employers were 
undisclosed, no consideration could be given to critical issues like 
the industry mix, workers' skill levels, the relative capital-to-labor 
mix in the firms, or the value added by the workers relative to 
their pay. With about 68% of all area manufacturing workers 
unionized, the labor movement was obviously to blame for 
creating this liability. 
Labor Management Relations were also seen as an impediment 
due to higher than average lost work days due to strikes. Fantus 
attempted to balance this negative situation with its view of future 
_52 
BEWARE of 
The Fantus Company is the nation's premier economic development 
consulting firm. It acts as a catalyst in the regional rotation of jobs 
between communities, providing essential services to America's 
migrating firms as they seek to find the lowest common denominator 
of wages, social wage legislation and business regulation. Careful 
examination of Fantus' activities and methods indicates that they may 
be a cause of, rather than a solution to, the decline of America's 
industrial heartland. 
Since 1934, Fantus has become the largest firm in the field of "plant 
site location analysis," claiming almost 70% of the market for consulting 
services when employers seek outside advice on an optimum location 
for expanding or relocating their operations. Although Fantus executives 
consistently deny that they actively encourage firms to pack up and 
leave their existing communities, Fantus advertisements in The Wall 
Street Journal indicate that in addition to offering services to firms 
already determined to construct, expand, consolidate, or shut down 
facilities, they offered relocation as a means of resolving personnel 
problems: "PERSONNEL PROBLEMS are often location problems: 
productivity—turnover—recruitment—cost." 
Fantus claims to have completed over 300 area development studies 
for communities seeking to attract industry, including a dozen in 
Indiana. Fantus executives claim they are chosen by job-starved 
communities due to the company's special expertise acquired through 
analyzing hundreds of communities for manufacturing, distribution and 
office clients seeking operating locations. Candid business executives 
have admitted, however, that Fantus is often chosen to provide 
development studies for communities out of fear that hiring a 
competitor could yield an unfavorable review of the community to 
migrating industry. 
Investigation of Fantus' nationwide activities has revealed a clear 
pattern of conflict of interest. A New York Times article in 1977 blamed 
Fantus for helping relocate 300 firms out of New York City. The same 
article reported that Fantus had been paid $280,000 to undertake studies 
to determine how the city could "stem the outward flow of companies 
and attract new industry." 
Fantus has provided development studies in Indiana for Anderson, 
Elkhart, Evansville, Fort Wayne, Frankfort, Indianapolis, Lafayette, 
Michigan City, Richmond, Tell City, Vincennes and Wabash. Whether 
or not plants that were relocated out of these communities did so on 
the advice of Fantus could only be confirmed by the company itself. 
If we examine Fantus' activities on behalf of other communities outside 
Indiana, however, we find circumstantial evidence that Indiana firms 
and plants were potential subjects of relocation overtures by Fantus 
clients. 
For example, in 1967 Fantus sold Pulaski County (Little Rock), 
Arkansas, the names of companies that employed over 110,000 Indiana 
workers as potential targets for relocation to Pulaski County. Industries 
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FANTUS 
suggested by Fantus to Kansas City, Kansas, from 1976-1978 as potential 
relocation targets included ones that employed over 48,000 Hoosiers. 
Target industries recommended for Oklahoma included auto parts, 
mobile home components, foundries, rubber, and electrical and 
electronic equipment—all major Indiana industries. Industries in each 
Indiana community that purchased Fantus economic development 
"battle plans" had previously been recommended by Fantus as likely 
relocation prospects for Arkansas, Kansas, or Oklahoma. 
Analysis of the plant locations of four Indiana-based firms that hired 
Fantus for plant location studies have revealed a different pattern. Ball 
Corporation (Muncie), Hillenbrand Industries (Batesville), Franklin 
Electric (Bluffton), and Peter Eckrich and Sons (Fort Wayne) all 
purchased Fantus studies and have plants located in communities, 
mostly in the "Sunbelt," that also purchased Fantus ^economic 
development studies. 
A review of over 30 development studies has yielded a host of Fantus 
recommendations to provide a better "business climate" by eliminating 
the gains of organized labor. In Eugene, Oregon, Fantus recommended 
a moratorium on union organizing, cuts in workers' and unemployment 
compensation, tax breaks for business, streamlining of environmental 
and zoning laws, and the suppression of discussion and dissent by 
diverse elements of the community about development activities. Fantus 
recommended opposition to plant closing legislation in Oregon and 
relaxation of anti-pollution rules in New Jersey. Fantus was used as 
a "hired gun" in corporate lobbying efforts to undermine the gains of 
lower-income residents and organized labor in Illinois. Fantus 
recommended a Right-to-Work law for Kentucky and praised the statute 
in Kansas for creating a favorable environment. Fantus "business 
climate" studies were used extensively in Right-to-Work drives in 
Missouri in 1978, Louisiana in 1976 and Idaho in 1985. 
In 1983, Fantus was acquired by the P.H.H. Group, Inc. P.H.H. 
visualized Fantus fitting nicely into its operations, which include: 
relocation services for transferred employees; buying, managing and 
reselling homes of transferred employees; area counseling, home-
finding and related services for corporations and their employees; and 
job search for spouses of transferred employees. 
Fantus executives are fond of describing the competition among 
communities for jobs as a "sweepstakes." It bears a more striking 
resemblance to a casino gambling operation with local politicians 
assuming the role of drunken tourist gamblers in Las Vegas and Fantus 
playing the house. 
Someone once defined a consultant as an individual who borrows 
your watch and then gets paid to tell you the time. On the surface this 
sounds like a useless, but relatively harmless, form of business 
transaction. In this case, it appears the consultant walks off with your 
watch in his pocket. 
—Mark Crouch 
•&M> 
is 
54 LABOR RESEARCH REVIEW 
trends: "Recently there has been evidence of a new cooperative 
spirit between management and labor." The evidence consisted 
of major concessionary contracts at two companies, Dana and 
Tokheim, both extracted under the threat of plant shutdowns. 
The Fantus framework of economic development demands the 
transformation of a strong labor movement. Marketing the 
community to footloose businesses requires the message, "Yes, 
we do have unions here, but they're the good kind—they 
cooperate, don't strike, and help reduce workers' wages." 
The Fantus report went on to recommend changes in the 
structure of the area's economic development organizations. It also 
recommended the establishment of a "high tech" center and a 
special campus-like industrial park to attract high tech firms. 
When the Fantus report was issued, newspaper accounts 
described its recommendations and reported favorable comments 
by business leaders. But the entire report was never made available 
for public inspection or community discussion. Fort Wayne 
Futures, a group of community leaders who claim their organization 
is a "think tank" working for a progressive community, cancelled 
their plans for a one-day conference to discuss the report at the 
request of the Corporate Council. Corporate Council membership 
includes the chief executives of the largest employers in the 
community, administrators of educational institutions, and top 
elected officials. The Corporate Council provided $28,000 of the 
$60,000 price for the Fantus Study. Thus, the power elite of the 
community had access to the report for planning their own agenda, 
while discussion and debate of the future of the community was 
blocked. 
Soon after the report, the Chamber of Commerce was reorganized, 
a new president was hired, a fundraising drive to raise $6.3 million 
for economic development was scheduled, and a program was 
launched to lure 8,700 jobs to Fort Wayne over five years. The 
jobs program focused on contacting the 1,000 firms Fantus had 
cited as likely targets. Visits to Illinois, Michigan and Ohio were 
planned to urge businesses to come to Fort Wayne. A "President's 
Club" was created, involving Chamber members who had 
participated in the Economic Development Group. Each member 
of the group committed to making at least one trip a year, at their 
own expense, to sell the city at trade shows or to meet business 
prospects. 
The Chamber of Commerce fundraising effort surpassed its 
original goal by $3 million, eventually gaining pledges of $9.2 
million. This war chest for economic development was earmarked 
primarily for advertising in national business periodicals, travel 
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to trade shows, and recruitment drives. The fundraising and the 
economic development efforts became even more serious after 
the International Harvester crisis. 
Harvester—The First Job War 
March 1982 found Fort Wayne's largest employer, International 
Harvester, struggling to avoid bankruptcy. Employment at the 
truck facility had peaked at 10,600 prior to the 172-day national 
strike that began in 1979. Production of the four-wheel drive Scout 
vehicle had been terminated in October 1980. Harvester officials 
let it be known that without special help from local and state 
governments, either the 60-year-old Fort Wayne facility or the 
17-year-old Springfield, Ohio plant might be closed. By mid-May 
the Mayor of Fort Wayne had assembled a financial package for 
Harvester valued at $20 million. That same month the United Auto 
Workers reached a new agreement providing an estimated $200 
million in concessions to the financially strapped company. 
At the end of July, Harvester officially announced that either 
the Fort Wayne or Springfield plant would be closed. While the 
State of Ohio worked to assemble a $28 million financial package 
for Springfield, Fort Wayne business and political leaders worked 
to increase their financial pacakge and to organize community 
support. The Chairman of the UAW-CAP Council enlisted the aid 
of the Northeast-Three Rivers Central Labor Council (CLC) to 
organize rallies and help collect over 100,000 form letters signed 
by area residents asking Harvester to stay. 
On August 12 the UAW-CAP Chairman and the CLC President 
led a delegation to Chicago to deliver the letters to Harvester head-
quarters. They returned pessimistic, unable to believe company 
officials' statements that no decision had yet been made. 
These two leaders were a study in contrasting styles and 
perspective on labor's role in economic development. The UAW-
CAP Chairman commanded a more powerful and effective 
political organization and was an outspoken critic of anti-labor 
business practices. He attended a few early meetings of the Allen 
County Labor-Management Committee before distancing himself 
from it and denouncing the effort as a farce. 
The CLC President, on the other hand, was an active participant 
in Fort Wayne Futures and other early development groups. He 
encouraged cooperative relations and engaged in quiet diplomacy 
with the business community rather than confrontation and public 
demonstrations. He repeatedly suggested that business leaders 
appoint the UAW-CAP Chairman to various committees, which 
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they refused because they regarded the UAW-CAP as too militant. 
The CLC President endured some criticism from within the labor 
movement for being too much of an accommodationist and for 
"spending too much time with his friends down at the Chamber 
of Commerce." 
By the end of August, Fort Wayne's economic package for 
Harvester had escalated to $31 million, but the company continued 
to study its options. With the community growing weary, in mid-
September business leaders attempted another ploy. An employer 
intending to close a plant can make outrageous concession 
demands, knowing full well the union will have to reject them 
and will then be blamed for the shutdown. Thus, a company can 
"poison the well" on the way out of town, decreasing the 
likelihood that the next employer rotating into the community will 
face pro-union sentiments. Such a scenario developed during these 
final days of the battle to save Harvester. 
Playing the role of concession demander, Fort Wayne Futures 
came up with a plan where Harvester workers could clip a coupon 
out of the newspaper, sign it, and send it to a local bank, pledging 
to give 15% of their earnings back to the company in the form 
of an unsecured loan. Full-page ads with the coupon appeared in 
the News-Sentinel and Journal-Gazette, and this "concession plan 
to save Harvester" was the subject of constant reports on radio 
and TV. 
The business-dominated Fort Wayne Futures had nothing to lose 
if the plan failed; if the plan worked, their prestige and influence 
would increase. The UAW leadership, on the other hand, was 
forced to reject the idea on several grounds. First, it was a blatant 
end run around the legally designated bargaining agent of the 
employees. Had Harvester accepted the money, it might have been 
an unfair labor practice. Second, although the UAW was willing 
to listen to additional concession demands from the company, they 
did not want to contribute to a bidding war between local unions 
at the two plants. Third, granting an unsecured loan to a company 
on the verge of bankruptcy did not make financial sense. When 
this plan failed miserably due to lack of worker support, the UAW 
was seen as the villain who torpedoed the good efforts of Fort 
Wayne Futures to save these jobs. 
The effects of this campaign were not isolated to Harvester and 
UAW Locals 57 and 305. Several other local unions were approached 
for concessions during this time. The labor movement in general 
viewed the entire campaign as an attempt by the business 
community to spread a plague of "concession fever." 
The CLC President, the only labor representative in Fort Wayne 
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Fort Wayne UAW-CAP 
Council Chair Julian 
Weller pours into sand-
bags some of the 100,000 
letters area residents 
wrote to plead with Inter-
national Harvester to stay 
in Fort Wayne. The sand-
bags were a symbol of the 
community spirit exhi-
bited in Fort Wayne's 
recovery from a 1982 
flood. 
Futures, refused to publicly disassociate himself from the group 
or to repudiate the campaign. Applying his deep belief in 
democratic principles to his participation in Fort Wayne Futures, 
he would not withdraw his support even though he had argued 
and voted against the proposed campaign. At every CLC meeting 
following the Harvester concessions campaign, he faced hostile 
delegates asking questions like, "What did Fort Wayne Futures 
do to screw us over this month?" 
As the most vocal advocate of cooperative labor-management 
relations, the CLC President found himself out on a limb with his 
labor constituents. When the civic-minded business leaders in Fort 
Wayne Futures sawed off the limb, in order to further the agenda 
set by Fantus and the Chamber of Commerce, they severed any 
hopes for labor participation in economic development activities 
sponsored by the business community. The CLC President 
eventually decided not to risk re-election, retired, and quite literal-
ly has not been heard of since. 
When Harvester accepted the $28 million deal from Ohio and 
rejected the final Fort Wayne bid, which had reached $41 million, 
it became obvious the community had been used. The 60-year-
old, multi-story Fort Wayne plant could never match the efficiency 
of the 17-year-old, single-level, modern facility in Springfield. 
Harvester had no intentions of keeping the Fort Wayne plant open, 
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but the company needed the bidding war to guarantee the cash 
flow from Ohio. 
Job Wars Continued 
The bidding war for Harvester was only the beginning of a series 
of contests in which the city assembled financial packages for 
corporations in hopes of winning jobs away from competing 
communities. A policy of aggressively recruiting jobs from 
neighboring states is encouraged by state government officials. 
In 1982, Indiana Governor Robert Orr refused to enter into a no-
raid pact with the governors of Michigan, Ohio, Illinois, Minnesota 
and Wisconsin. 
The state has carried on a sophisticated advertising campaign 
based on Indiana's low taxes, unemployment benefits (the lowest 
in the U.S.), and low workers' compensation (49th in the U.S.). 
Lt. Governor John Mutz told the Michigan Senate in 1985 that, 
over a three-year period, these lower costs had allowed Indiana 
to entice 63 Michigan companies to build plants on the Hoosier 
side of the border. 
The state government has also underwritten many of the 
incentive packages put together by Fort Wayne to compete with 
other communities. Fort Wayne's participation in this cut-throat 
competition has produced mixed results. In each case, however, 
the citizenry has not been allowed access to the planning process 
and has been deceived about the real costs and benefits to the 
community of the deals cooked up by business and government 
leaders. 
In early 1983 the Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette reported that the 
city and county were giving a $3.4 million building to ITT Optical 
Aerospace Division to subsidize its bid for production of a new 
generation of field radios for the U.S. Army. This disclosure was 
attacked by city and county officials, who claimed it threatened 
the 500 predicted jobs because it allowed the main competitor, 
Cincinnati Electronics, to engineer a public subsidy of its own. 
In August 1983, Fort Wayne's pursuit of the high tech future 
recommended by Fantus paid off when Micro Source, a new 
manufacturer of rigid disc portable computers, announced 
intentions to build its first factory in Fort Wayne. Fort Wayne had 
won an estimated 200 to 900 jobs away from New Lebanon, Ohio 
with a package of loans and loan guarantees worth $6.5 million, 
including an unsecured $1 million for Micro Source's working 
capital. By February 1984, the company had collapsed, forced into 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy by its creditors, without any jobs or 
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computers being produced. Fort Wayne lost $1.2 million on the 
deal. 
In November 1983 General Electric received $4.1 million in tax 
abatements and job training funds for the relocation of 800 jobs 
from Evandale, Ohio to Fort Wayne. At the same time, 550 GE 
jobs building electric motors were relocated out of Fort Wayne 
to Kentucky, Tennessee and Mexico. 
GE agreed to give the city the abandoned motor plant and 
thereby saved an estimated $30,000 a year in taxes. Both the 
abandoned plant and the building to be renovated for the new 
jobs from Ohio were inside an area to be designated an Urban 
Enterprise Zone, eligible for additional state tax breaks. When Fort 
Wayne applied for one of the six available Enterprise Zone 
designations, local businessmen announced the formation of the 
Indiana Enterprise Co. to open an enterprise center for new 
business to operate in the abandoned GE plant. The state awarded 
the Enterprise Zone designation to the city after Fort Wayne 
pointed to the donated building. But three months later the Indiana 
Enterprise Co. called off plans for this center, citing an engineering 
study which showed it would be cheaper to build a new building 
than to renovate and maintain the former GE factory. 
When General Motors announced its intention to build a new 
highly automated pickup truck assembly plant with a just-in-time 
inventory system and employment of around 3,000, Fort Wayne 
was elated. The city, county and state governments pledge $30 
million in sewer and water line extensions, roads, a special 
interchange on Interstate 69, and job-training funds. 
In its August 1984 announcement, GM mentioned that some 
operations might be consolidated at the new Fort Wayne plant. 
Five days later, GM announced that the St. Louis truck plant would 
be closed and truck lines at Janesville, Wisconsin and Flint, 
Michigan would also be shut down. Approximately 7,400 workers 
were employed in those facilities. Then in July 1985, almost 11 
months after the original announcement and with the construction 
project about 30% complete, GM admitted that it was unlikely 
that any current Fort Wayne area residents would be hired, since 
the plant would be staffed by displaced UAW members from other 
facilities. In March 1986 it was disclosed that the cost of the 
incentive packages had escalated to $71 million because state 
officials had drastically underestimated the cost of the roads. Thus, 
a $71 million public subsidy was provided to a highly profitable 
firm to rotate existing jobs and workers while deployment of new 
technology will reduce employment from 7,400 to 3,000. 
In early 1985 it was announced that Fort Wayne had won 300 
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jobs away from Columbus, Ohio with a package of airport improve-
ments initially estimated at $2 million for Burlington Northern 
Air Freight. Five months later, the incentive package had grown 
to $28 million, and it was disclosed the jobs would be mostly 
part-time. 
The Results: Quantity, not Quality 
The whole of Northeastern Indiana is winning recognition as 
a "development hotbed," not only because of the activity in Fort 
Wayne, but because of activity in the surrounding rural areas. 
While there have been some notable successes in luring jobs from 
neighboring states, little attention has been focused on the quality 
of the jobs or the costs to the community in lost tax revenues. 
Indiana Northeastern Development, a regional economic 
development agency covering nine counties in the northeast 
corner of the state, reported more than 95 plants employing 9,300 
people had begun operations between January 1983 and August 
1985. Almost 90 percent of these are in small towns, and many 
are auto supplier firms from Michigan and Ohio. 
If Northeast Indiana is a hotbed of economic development, it 
is primarily due to the stealing of auto-related jobs from Ohio and 
Michigan and the militarization of the economy. One study found 
that more than half of 59 new plants announced during 1983 and 
1984 were tied to the auto industry, with 70% of the jobs subject 
to cyclical swings in the economy. They will also be vulnerable 
if foreign producers continue to flood the U.S. with imported cars. 
Another 13% of the jobs were with military suppliers and are 
subject to the uncertainty of competitive bidding and political 
swings in Congress and the White House. Over half of the plants 
and two-thirds of the jobs were being provided by Ohio and 
Michigan-based firms, who are constructing small satellite plants 
in a geographically dispersed, decentralized production network. 
One of the Ohio-based employers, Eagle-Picher, described the 
latest trend in its annual report: 
Average employment at our plants is approximately 100 
persons. With business units of this size, we are able to 
be highly selective in our labor force. We can also benefit 
from the intangible qualities that are frequently found in 
a small enterprise. . . .We believe plants which are widely 
dispersed geographically provide the company with some 
degree of insulation against regional disruptions caused 
by weather, energy availability, anomalies in the labor 
force, or tr 
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force, or transportation interruption. . . .The dispersion 
of the company's plants is thoughtfully considered. We 
tend to identify locations that offer a positive business 
climate and are away from major metropolitan centers. 
This leads us to smaller cities and towns where frequently 
Eagle-Picher is one of the largest employers in the area. 
While this beggar-thy-neighbor approach to development may 
provide some jobs in the short run by providing migrating 
employers lower wages and taxes, it is only a matter of time before 
workers in neighboring states are going to be willing to lower their 
standards enough to steal the jobs back. Once started, it's impossible 
to stop the downward spiral in wages and working conditions 
created by business leaders pushing the notion that "half a loaf 
is better than none." 
One privately-held company responsible for several of the new 
plants is Lyall Electric Inc., of Kendallville, Indiana. Lyall produces 
wiring harnesses for the auto industry in a totally decentralized 
production process, operating 35 plants out of 18 locations in 14 
small towns spread over 6 northeastern Indiana counties. The 
population in these communities ranges from 286 to 2,509. The 
company has received over $350,000 in on-the-job training 
subsidies provided through the Job Training Partnership Act for 
290 of its 1,600 employees. The average wage at placement in the 
new plants is $3.99 per hour, and turnover rate is 35%. 
The trends evident in new plant activity in Northeast Indiana 
pose some difficult problems for workers and the labor movement. 
While the new jobs are better than no jobs at all, wages of $4 to 
$6 per hour do not replace the purchasing power of the $10 to 
$12 per hour jobs lost when unionized plants closed. As a result, 
in order to maintain a decent standard of living, often two or three 
members of each family will be forced to work outside the home. 
The placement of the plants in rural communities and the small 
size of the work forces increase the difficulty of organizing and 
the cost of servicing labor agreements. Many employers have made 
known their interest in becoming or remaining union-free while 
negotiating for tax abatements, Industrial Revenue Bonds, and 
training grants financed by the public. For example, the Angola 
City Council approved a $150,000 loan for Beurmann-Marshall 
Corp. of Lansing, Michigan, a producer of direct marketing 
advertisements for the auto industry. After the loan approval, a 
senior vice-president of production for the firm told the News-
Sentinel, "We have the UAW in Lansing. We want to avoid 
unionization here by being competitive so the employees don'f 
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feel the need for a third party." 
The Fort Wayne area building trades unions have benefited from 
work building new plants in Fort Wayne, but much of the work 
on small plants in rural areas has gone to non-union construction 
firms. This has been by mandate of the employers opening the 
plants in order to limit organized labor's influence in the 
communities. Members of Carpenters Local 232, who were assigned 
work on one of the plants near the Michigan border, were told 
by the contractor, "If anyone asks, tell them you are non-union 
or we'll lose this subcontract." 
Labor's Role in Economic Development: 
The Lesson from Fort Wayne 
The labor movement has long opposed policies which promote 
economic dislocaton and anti-worker activities. Labor has called 
for the elimination of state and local tax abatements used to lure 
employers from community to community, the repeal of Section 
14(b) of the National Labor Relations Act allowing states to enact 
open-shop laws, and the federalization of workers' and unemploy-
ment compensation to establish uniform benefit, eligibility, and 
employer costs. But the labor movement appears to be deeply 
divided at both the national and local levels over participation in 
labor-management cooperation programs, productivity-enhancing 
employee involvement programs, worker buyouts, and employee 
stock ownership plans. 
Local labor leaders are being pressured and pulled in different 
directions by the needs of rank-and-file membership, by their 
international unions, and by local government and business 
leaders regarding these controversial issues. Without a keen 
understanding of the wide range of roles the labor movement can 
play, both in blocking anti-worker agendas of others and in 
providing an alternative agenda for the planning process, labor 
will continue to be relegated to a subordinate role by the other 
powerful players—business and government. The assistance of the 
national AFL-CIO and international unions is needed to provide 
education at the state and local levels. A full internal discussion 
of labor's options in local economic development activities is 
essential for building effective defensive and offensive strategies. 
It is obvious that the labor movement cannot afford to ignore 
economic development as it is being played out in many cities 
across the country. Neither can individual labor leaders risk being 
sucked in and alienated from their membership by playing the 
lone arranger. As in other activities, labor's strength remains in 
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largest flea market. 
forming an informed and united front. Business leaders and their 
allies in government expect to control the process, to continue to 
provide public subsidies for private decisions and profit making, 
and to sidetrack democratic discussion and debate of alternative 
agendas and perspectives. 
Local labor leaders have the potential to move from a defensive 
posture of simply monitoring economic development activities for 
anti-labor bias to a position as watchdogs for the interests of the 
entire community, and as spokespersons for labor's natural 
political allies: minorities, the unemployed and the poor. The 
potential also exists for labor to influence the creation of a 
structure at the local level to encourage local control of local 
economies and to increase insulation from the whims of absentee 
corporate management. 
In developing guidelines for labor participation in these activities 
and in analyzing the current practice of economic development, 
it is helpful to separate the economic development planning 
process from the economic development plans that result. 
The economic development planning process can provide a rare 
opportunity for full democratic discussion on the future of our 
communities. Business may discourage this, charging that it would 
lead to factionalism in the community and an unfavorable business 
climate. Finding answers to the following questions can help labor 
leaders determine if the planning process is fair, democratic, and 
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worthy of participation: 
• Is the process initiated, dominated and controlled by a business 
group such as the Chamber of Commerce? 
• Is business membership on committees, commissions or boards 
balanced by representatives of labor, consumer, environmental, 
religious, and other community groups? 
• Have outside consultants been hired to guide development 
efforts? On what basis were they chosen? Who decided the 
character of whatever study may be conducted? Was the study 
or its recommendations open to public inspection, community 
discussion, and debate? 
• Are the local media used to push business viewpoints under 
the guise of ' 'development plans," while public discussions 
and/or objections are labeled as obstructionist? 
• Are decisions made in secret, while community input, discussion 
and participation are discouraged except to rubber stamp what 
has already been decided? 
• Is labor's role only that of being a "showpiece" in a labor-
management cooperation committee with no real decision-
making power? 
It is possible that a relatively democratic planning process will 
yield unacceptable economic development plans due to a business 
majority on the planning committee. The decision to provide 
support or opposition for development plans might be based on 
consideration of the following questions: 
• Do the plans take on an anti-worker or anti-union orientation 
by calling for moratoriums on union organizing, cuts in workers' 
and unemployment compensation payments, or opposition to 
public employee bargaining rights? 
• Do the plans damage the quality of the environment or harm 
community residents by calling for relaxation of zoning, health 
and safety, air pollution, toxic waste, or building code^ 
regulations in order to provide a "good business climate"? 
• Do the plans tend to subsidize corporate investment that would 
have happened anyway? 
• Do the plans attempt to shift the tax burden from the corporate, 
sector to community residents through tax abatements or bq 
substituting sales taxes for corporate taxes? 
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Are the plans based on corporate-oriented ideology and justified 
by weak arguments based on the assumption that communities 
must compete in a them-against-us atmosphere leading to job 
wars? 
• Is the only criterion the number of jobs, with no consideration 
of the quality of the jobs or their cost to the community? 
Answers to these model questions can provide labor leadership 
with valuable information for developing policy positions and 
education programs. The decision to participate in the economic 
development planning process, or to endorse or oppose the 
development plans that result, can be exceedingly dangerous for 
local labor leaders. Without careful consideration and analysis of 
alternatives, labor can be made to appear as a destructive rather 
than a positive force in local communities. Failure to adequately 
prepare for participation in local economic development activities 
could cripple organized labor for decades to come. • 
Morse Cutting Tool 
The Plant Closing That Wasn't 
For the workers at Morse Cutting Tool in New Bedford, 
Massachusetts, the handwriting was on the wall. Either they could 
accept drastic concessions from their conglomerate-owner, Gulf and 
Western, or their 160-year-old plant would close. It would be 
another in the long string of closings that was dragging down the 
economy and the morale of the region. 
But the workers marshaled the forces of their union—Local 277 
of the United Electrical Workers—and brought the community 
together to fight and win the struggle to save their plant and the 
hundreds of jobs it provided. 
Now a new booklet—The Struggle to Save Morse Cutting Tool: 
A Successful Community Campaign— documents the fight to save 
Morse, and the electrifying effect Local 277's struggle had on the 
community. This 40-page booklet details the "warning signals" that 
foreshadowed a possible plant closing; Local 277's strike in 1982; 
the City of New Bedford's nationally-noted threat to use eminent 
domain to take over the plant; and the eventual buyout of Morse 
by a dynamic Michigan businessman. 
The Struggle to Save Morse is a must for workers, union and 
community leaders in need of creative solutions to cutbacks and 
shutdowns. 
Mail $2.00 for each copy to Labor Education Center, 
Southeastern Massachusetts University, North Dartmouth, 
MA 02747. 
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